The main text preserves the original certificate design and key-delegation proposals. The identity signature profile defines the v0.0.107 hybrid signature and key encodings. Current directory certificate envelopes use epoch-based expiration and a map of signatures.

Certificate format

David Stainton

Abstract

This document proposes a certificate format that Katzenpost mix server, directory authority server and clients will use.


Conventions used in this document

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.

Introduction

Mix servers and directory authority servers need to have key agility in the sense of operational abilities such as key rotation and key revocation. That is, we wish for mixes and authorities to periodically utilize a long-term signing key for generating certificates for new short-term signing keys.

Yet another use-case for these certificate is to replace the use of JOSE RFC7515 in the voting directory authority system KATZMIXPKI for the multi-signature documents exchanged for voting and consensus.

Certificate format

The CBOR RFC7049 serialization format is used to serialize certificates:

Signature is a cryptographic signature which has an associated signer ID.

type Signature struct {
// Identity is the identity of the signer.
Identity []byte
// Signature is the actual signature value.
Signature []byte
}

Certificate structure for serializing certificates.

type certificate struct {
// Version is the certificate format version.
Version uint32

// Expiration is seconds since Unix epoch.
Expiration int64

// KeyType indicates the type of key
// that is certified by this certificate.
KeyType string

// Certified is the data that is certified by
// this certificate.
Certified []byte

// Signatures are the signature of the certificate.
Signatures []Signature
}

That is, one or more signatures sign the certificate. However the Certified field is not the only information that is signed. The Certified field along with the other non-signature fields are all concatenated together and signed. Before serialization the signatures are sorted by their identity so that the output is binary deterministic.

Certificate types

The certificate type field indicates the type of certificate. So far we have only two types:

  • identity key certificate

  • directory authority certificate

Both mixes and directory authority servers have a secret, long-term identity key. This key is ideally stored encrypted and offline, it’s used to sign key certificate documents. Key certificates contain a medium-term signing key that is used to sign other documents. In the case of an “authority signing key”, it is used to sign vote and consensus documents whereas the “mix singing key” is used to sign mix descriptors which are uploaded to the directory authority servers.

Certificate key types

It’s more practical to continue using Ed25519 ED25519 keys but it’s also possible that in the future we could upgrade to a stateless hash based post quantum cryptographic signature scheme such as SPHINCS-256 or SPHINCS+. SPHINCS256

Golang API

Our golang implementation is agnostic to the specific cryptographic signature scheme which is used. Cert can handle single and multiple signatures per document and has a variety of helper functions that ease use for multi signature use cases.

Acknowledgments

This specification was inspired by Tor Project’s certificate format specification document:

References

ED25519

https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032.

KATZMIXPKI

Angel, Y., Piotrowska, A., Stainton, D., “Katzenpost Mix Network Public Key Infrastructure Specification”, December 2017, https://katzenpost.network/docs/specs/pdf/pki.pdf.

RFC2119

Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119.

RFC7049

C. Bormann, P. Hoffman, “Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)”, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), October 2013, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049.

RFC7515

Jones, M., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., “JSON Web Signature (JWS)”, May 2015, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515.

RFC7693

Saarinen, M-J., Ed., and J-P. Aumasson, “The BLAKE2 Cryptographic Hash and Message Authentication Code (MAC)”, RFC 7693, DOI 10.17487/RFC7693, November 2015, http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7693.

SPHINCS256

Bernstein, D., Hopwood, D., Hulsing, A., Lange, T., Niederhagen, R., Papachristodoulou, L., Schwabe, P., Wilcox O’Hearn, Z., “SPHINCS: practical stateless hash-based signatures”, http://sphincs.cr.yp.to/sphincs-20141001.pdf.

Appendix: Identity signature profile

This profile defines identity signatures and key encodings for Namenlos with Katzenpost v0.0.107. Its rules apply to the current directory certificate envelopes. The main text above preserves the original certificate design.

Here, || means byte concatenation. CBOR fields carry raw public keys as byte strings. The key bytes have no ASN.1 wrapper, length prefix, or text encoding.

Key Value Explanation
Signature scheme Ed25519 Sphincs+ Use this exact name in the baseline certificate KeyType and document PKISignatureScheme. The space is significant.
Public key 96 bytes Ed25519 public key, 32 bytes, followed by SPHINCS+ public key, 64 bytes.
Private key 192 bytes Ed25519 seed, 32 bytes, Ed25519 public key, 32 bytes, then SPHINCS+ secret key, 128 bytes.
Identity hash BLAKE2b-256(identity_public_key) Hash the 96 raw public-key bytes. The result is 32 raw bytes.

The signature scheme definition fixes the name and component order. Identity hashes use sequential BLAKE2b from RFC 7693 with a 32-byte output. Do not truncate BLAKE2b-512 to produce BLAKE2b-256.

Key files

The public PEM label is ED25519 SPHINCS+ PUBLIC KEY. The private PEM label is ED25519 SPHINCS+ PRIVATE KEY. A PEM payload is the base64 encoding of the corresponding raw key. There are no PEM headers or ASN.1 fields.

The signature private payload is Ed25519_seed[32] || Ed25519_public[32] || SPHINCS_secret[128]. This encoding permits import of reference key files. An implementation can use its own internal storage format. The PEM codec wraps the raw private bytes.

Signature algorithm

Use pure Ed25519 from RFC 8032, Section 5.1 and SPHINCS+ round 3.1, parameter set SPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f-robust. The SPHINCS+ parameters are n=32, h=68, d=17, FORS height=9, FORS trees=35, and Winternitz w=16. Use the robust tweakable hashes. The public key is PUB_SEED[32] || root[32]. The secret key is SK_SEED[32] || SK_PRF[32] || PUB_SEED[32] || root[32].

Let M be the exact byte string to sign. Directory objects use their specified signing inputs. Both component algorithms sign the same M:

signature = Ed25519.Sign(ed_sk, M) || SPHINCS+.Sign(spx_sk, M)

The first signature is 64 bytes. The second is 49856 bytes. The complete signature is 49920 bytes.

The SPHINCS+ signature contains its 32-byte R, FORS signature, and hypertree signature in the order defined by the primitive specification. The signer uses fresh 32-byte optrand for SPHINCS+. Do not add an external prehash, context, message prefix, or length field. In particular, this profile uses neither Ed25519ph nor SLH-DSA. Verification MUST reject an incorrect signature length. It MUST accept only when both component signatures verify against M.

The implementation composes the two signatures and the two public keys in this order. Its SPHINCS+ selection fixes SHAKE-256f and robust hashing, the parameters, and the key and signature encodings.

Last modified November 3, 2026: specs: process review feedback (11a70db8)